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The International Trial of the Century?
A "Cross-Fire" Exchange on the First
Case Before the Yugoslavia War
Crimes Tribunal*
Michael Scharf** & Valerie Epps***
Introduction
CRaIG GA Err: On May 25, 1993, the United Nations Security Council
established the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal. Three years later, judges
have been elected, a prosecutor appointed, rules of procedure promulgated,
a courtroom and detention facility erected, over fifty indictments issued,
and the first trial-that of Dusko Tadit-is set to commence on May 7, 1996.
We are fortunate to have with us today two experts on the Yugoslavia
Tribunal and, more generally, international criminal law: Professor Valerie
Epps of Suffolk University Law School and Professor Michael Scharf of the
New England School of Law. Professor Epps teaches international law, has
published numerous articles in the area of international criminal law, and
is currently writing a book on international law specifically designed for
undergraduates. Before joining the faculty of the New England School of
Law, Professor Scharf served as Attorney-Adviser for U.N. Affairs at the
State Department, where he played a key role in formulating the U.S. pro-
posals for the Yugoslavia Tribunal and in drafting the Security Council res-
olutions leading to its adoption. He is co-author of the recently published
book, "An Insider's Guide to the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia. ' 2
In "cross-fire" format, the panelists will address the following four
questions: (1) Was the creation of an international tribunal the best
response to the atrocities in the former Yugoslavia? (2) What is your
* This Article is an expanded version of a presentation delivered at the Conference
of International Law Journals on March 29, 1996, in Washington, D.C.
** Associate Professor of Law and Director of the New England Center for
International Law and Policy at the New England School of Law, formerly Attorney-
Advisor, Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, 1989-1993; J.D., Duke
University School of Law, 1988; A.B., Duke University, 1985.
*** Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School, Boston. LL.M., Harvard
University, 1978; J.D., Boston University, 1972; B.A., Birmingham University, England,
1965.
1. Member of the ILSA Board of Directors and Editor in Chief of the ILSAJournal of
International & Comparative Law, which is hosted by Nova Southeastern University.
2. VIRG N A Moius & MicHAEL ScHARF, AN INsIDR's GUmE To THE lNTERNATIONAL
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appraisal of the Statute and Rules of the Tribunal? (3) What is your
appraisal of the Tribunal's first decisions on the pre-trial motions in the
Tadit case? and (4) What is your appraisal of the Tribunal's chances for
success?
I. Was the Creation of an International Tribunal the Best Response to
the Atrocities in the Former Yugoslavia?
VALERIE EpPs: It is always salutary to remember that the legal process
swings into action when everything else has failed. On the national scene,
legislatures pass criminal laws. These laws are intended both to reflect the
community's moral consensus and to deter violations. A police force, pros-
ecutor's office, and court system are put in place because history assures us
that individuals and groups will violate the law, and that the police force
will be unable or unwilling to prevent violations. After the law has been
broken, the police set about finding the perpetrators and bringing them
before a court. The court process is designed to discover whether suspects
did in fact violate the law and, if so, to issue punishment.
In the international arena there is no strictly analogous legislature,
but, particularly in the latter half of the twentieth century, the international
community has agreed upon a core group of rules that prohibit certain
types of behavior. Some of these acts are prohibited regardless of location
or circumstances, while other behavior is only prohibited in particular con-
texts. 3 Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws or
customs of war, genocide, and crimes against humanity are absolutely pro-
hibited, and individual perpetrators are held to be criminally responsible
regardless of whether they were acting on orders from a superior.4 This
body of law has not been applied in any systematic way because the inter-
national machinery of a police force and court system has been lacking.
The only groups we have at the international level that remotely resem-
ble an international police force are the United Nations peacekeeping
3. Security Council Resolution 827 establishes the International Tribunal and
states its purpose as:
prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of international humani-
tarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia between 1 January
1991 and a date to be determined by the Security Council upon the restoration
of peace and to this end... adopt[s] the Statute of the International Tribunal
annexed to the [Secretary-General's] report.
S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), reprinted in 32
LL.M. 1203, 1204 (1993). The resolution was adopted unanimously on May 25, 1993.
The Tribunal's Statute provides that the Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute "per-
sons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law" (art. 1); "per-
sons committing or ordering to be committed grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949" (art. 2); "persons violating the laws or customs of war" (art. 3);
"persons committing genocide" (art. 4); and "persons responsible for... crimes [against
humanity] when committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in char-
acter, and directed against any civilian population" (art. 5), Statute of the International
Tribunal, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. 5/25704 (1993), reprinted in 32
I.L.M. 1159, 1192 et seq. (1993) [hereinafter Tribunal's Statute].
4. See Tribunal's Statute, supra note 3, art. 7(4), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 1194.
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forces that have been put together on an ad hoc basis under the auspices of
the Security Council to deal with particular crises, such as Somalia, the
Persian Gulf War, and Haiti.
When the Balkan war broke out it was clear that the international
community, and more particularly the United Nations Security Council,
had little interest in attempting preventative measures apart from an arms
embargo.5 No state was willing to muster a peacekeeping force, either to
prevent the spread of war, or to weigh in on one side or another. The war
escalated and massive atrocities occurred. The international community
first failed to prevent the war and later failed to curtail it. The creation of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia by the U.N.
Security Council under its Chapter VII powers can thus be regarded as an
attempt on the part of the international community to mop up after a mas-
sive failure. While the creation of the Tribunal was certainly not the best
response to the atrocities, it remained perhaps one of only a few options.
Was it the best option? What else might have been done in the wake of
failure?
Historically after wars, and particularly civil wars, the options avail-
able are: (1) grant everyone amnesty; (2) create a high-level body, often
called a "truth commission," to write a report on what happened so that the
events are documented; (3) prosecute those who are suspected of violating
the law in the local courts; (4) create an international court to try those
who have violated the laws of war or other agreed upon important norms.
Each one of the above options has points in its favor and points
against it. Amnesty may promote peace because the country does not have
to live through the ordeal of lengthy trials that re-enact the horrors of the
past. There is also the possibility that trials might be biased because the
group in power is likely to prosecute its old opponents and exonerate its
supporters. The great drawback to amnesty is that the victims of all the
gross violations of law will never have their day in court. The perpetrators
will go free and the lesson to be learned is that "all is [indeed] fair" in war,
and that no matter what any individual does, there will be no penalty.
Grants of amnesty certainly do not deter, and may even encourage, future
criminal acts.
"Truth commissions" have been used in a number of states-most
notably in El Salvador,6 and currently in South Africa.7 Depending upon
5. S.C. Res. 713, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/713 (1991) (arms
embargo imposed); S.C. Res. 1021, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1021
(1995) (arms embargo lifted).
6. The Commission on the Truth for El Salvador was formally established on July
15, 1992, under the Salvadorian Peace Accords. U.N. Dep't of Public Information, El
Salvador Agreements: The Path to Peace, U.N. Doc. DPI/1208-92614 (1992); Report of the
Commission on the Truth for El Salvador: From Madness to Hope, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess.,
Annex, U.N. Doc. S/25500 (1993) (English version). See generally Thomas Buergenthal,
The United Nations Truth Commission for El Salvador, 27 VANI. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 497
(1994).
7. See generally Lynne Duke, Truth Commission Starts Search in South Africa: Vic-
tims Testify Despite Efforts to Stop Hearing, WASH. PosT, Apr. 16, 1996, at A10.
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the powers given to them, they may or may not identify the culprits. The
reports issued by truth commissions do have the positive effect of docu-
menting for posterity the events that occurred so that they will not be
swept under the rug. The criticisms leveled at truth commissions are, how-
ever, considerable. The "truth" may be one-sided because the members of
the commission are appointed by the group who has gained power. If the
commission lists the names of suspects, those suspects have no opportu-
nity to defend themselves.8 If the commission does not name the offend-
ers, but only reports generally on the atrocities, the guilty remain free
without sanction.9
Prosecuting the suspects in local court systems has the advantage of
not allowing the culprits to remain free, but has the disadvantage of mak-
ing that nation relive the atrocities, inflaming old hostilities.10 The court
system may well be considered biased as the government will in all
probability prosecute its enemies and exonerate its allies. Historically,
there are very few examples of governments prosecuting members of their
own forces after a war.
The fourth alternative, creating an international criminal court to try
the offenders, has seldom occurred. The Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after
World War II were not courts created by the international community, but
rather victors' courts created by the Allies to try the vanquished. Those
courts established important precedents in terms of the substantive
offenses for which suspects could be tried, and reaffirmed the concept of
individual responsibility for violations of international norms. However,
they were not international courts in the sense of being created by mem-
bers of the international community who were not parties to the conflict.
Given the failures of the international community in connection with the
Balkan War, the creation of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugo-
slavia by the Security Council may well have been the best option available.
Perhaps we should wonder why an international tribunal was created
for Yugoslavia, but not for numerous earlier large scale atrocities. More
generally, we might ask ourselves why it has taken so long for the interna-
tional community to get around to the creation of international criminal
courts. The answer, I think, lies in that all embracing concept of "national
sovereignty." States are very reluctant to submit to the jurisdiction of an
8. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission has overcome this
objection to some extent. The regular process of criminal indictments goes forward. If
the suspect confesses, s/he can apply to the commission for amnesty, and amnesty may
be granted provided the suspect admits to all of the offenses that the truth commission
lists. The suspect can, however, go forward with a trial and offer a full defense in a
regular criminal proceeding. Obviously, the prospect of amnesty for a confession versus
the uncertainty of the outcome of a criminal trial may well persuade some suspects to
issue false confessions. Id.
9. See generally Richard Goldstone, Exposing Human Rights Abuses-A Help or Hin-
drance to Reconciliation, 22 HAsINGS CONSr. L.Q. 607 (1995).
10. For example, the Ethiopian government is currently conducting trials of the for-
mer leaders of the Marxist government that overthrew Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974
and ruled until its ouster in 1991. See generally James C. McKinley Jr., Ethiopia Tries
Former Rulers in 70's Deaths, N.Y. Tnw.s, Apr. 23, 1996, at Al.
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entity over which they do not have total control. Nations may well feel that
they have not agreed to the substantive or procedural law which governs
the tribunal. They may not agree with the method of electing judges or the
types of punishment meted out. It should be remembered that less than
one third of states have submitted to the compulsory jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice. Among the permanent members of the
Security Council only the United Kingdom currently accepts the court's
compulsory jurisdiction, and its acceptance has a raft of exceptions. If a
permanent international criminal court were created, it is extremely
unlikely, at this juncture, that any of the more powerful nations would
allow it mandatory jurisdiction or would opt to submit to its jurisdiction.
MICHAEL ScHAuR: To begin with, I take issue with Professor Epps state-
ment that the function of an international tribunal is to "mop up after a
massive failure"'1 on the part of the international community and that "the
legal process swings into action [only after] everything else has failed."12
The better view, I believe, is that the very existence of an international crim-
inal tribunal can serve an important preventive function. Richard Gold-
stone, the Chief Prosecutor of the Yugoslavia Tribunal, recently cited
evidence that the existence of the Tribunal deterred human rights viola-
tions during Croatian army offensives against Serb forces last year. He said
that "fear of prosecution in the Hague led Croatian authorities to issue
orders to their soldiers to protect Serb civilian rights when Croatia took
control of the Krajina and Western Slavonia region of the country."13
Thus, the Tribunal should be seen not as an end, but as a beginning, in
terms of the role it can play in preventing the next round in the cycle of
violence.
Professor Epps mentioned four alternative ways of responding to viola-
tions of international humanitarian law: (1) granting amnesty, (2) creating
a truth commission, (3) pursuing domestic prosecutions, or (4) creating an
international criminal court to try the offenders. 14 As explained below, in
the context of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the creation of an inter-
national tribunal was not only the best choice, it was the only viable
option.
While prosecution and punishment can serve as a strong deterrent,
the granting of immunity through an amnesty breeds contempt for the law
and encourages future violations. History records that the international
amnesty given to the Turkish officials responsible for the massacre of over
one million Armenians during World War I encouraged Adolph Hitler
some twenty years later to conclude that Germany could pursue his genoci-
dal policies with impunity. 15 After the Nazis exterminated six million Jews
11. See supra Part I.
12. See id.
13. War Crinies Prosecutor Says Tribunal May Have Deterred Violations, DET=SCHE
PRESsE-AGENTUR, Jan. 26, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnvs File.
14. See supra Part .
15. Indeed, in a speech to his Commanding Generals, Hitler dismissed concerns
about accountability for acts of aggression and genocide by stating, "Who after all is
today speaking about the destruction of the Armenians?" Adolf Hitler, Speech to Chief
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during the Holocaust, the world community said "never again," and prose-
cuted the major Nazi war criminals before the International War Crimes
Tribunal at Nuremberg. Yet, the hope of "never again" quickly became the
reality of "again and again" as the world community failed to take similar
action to bring those responsible to justice when four million people were
murdered in Stalin's purges (1937-1953), five million were annihilated in
China's Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), two million were butchered in
Cambodia's killing fields (1975-1979), thirty thousand disappeared in
Argentina's Dirty War (1976-1983), 200,000 were massacred in East Timor
(1975-1985), 750,000 were exterminated in Uganda (1971-1987), 100,000
Kurds were gassed in Iraq (1987-1988), and 75,000 died in El Salvador's
civil war (1980-1992).16
According to Professor Rudi Rummel, during the twentieth century
four times as many people have been killed by their own governments than
in all the international wars combined.17 The U.N. Human Rights Com-
mission has concluded that immunity is one of the main reasons for the
continuation of grave human rights violations throughout the world.18
Indeed, fact-finding reports on Chile and El-Salvador indicate that the
granting of amnesty or de facto immunity has led to increased abuse in
those countries.' 9 The evidence strongly suggests that the failure of the
international community to prosecute Pol Pot, Idi Amin, Saddam Hussein,
and Mohammed Aideed, among others, encouraged the Serbs to launch
their policy of ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia with the expecta-
tion that they would not be held accountable for their international crimes.
Moreover, failure to prosecute human rights crimes in the former Yugosla-
via, which has suffered from an endless cycle of violence and abuse going
back over 1,000 years, could serve as a virtual license to repeat the crimes,
and would send a signal to other rogue regimes around the world that they
have nothing to lose by instituting such repressive measures and abuses.
As Professor Epps points out, in recent years the international commu-
nity has become quite enamored with the idea of "truth commissions" as
an alternative to prosecutions in order to document abuses and facilitate
national reconciliation. Although they can play an important role, 20 truth
Commanders and Commanding Generals (Aug. 22, 1939), quoted in M. CHEIF BAS-
sioum, CRIMES AGAINST Hu NrIrY IN INTERNATiONAL CRIMINAL LAw 176 n.96 (1992).
16. See Arlene Levinson, Genocide a Thriving Doctrine in 20th Century, FC THE STAR,
Sept. 18, 1995, at A9.
17. Professor Rudi Rummel documents that as many as 170 million persons have
been murdered by their own governments. R.J. RUMMEL, DEATH By GOVERNMENT 9
(1994).
18. United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Working Group on
Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Agenda Item 10(6), at
24, U.N. Doc. A/49/342 (1994), reprinted in 3 TRANsrnoNAL JUSTICE: How EMERGING
DImocRAciEs RECKON WITH FomiER REGIMES 19 (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995) [hereinafter
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE].
19. Michael P. Scharf, Swapping Amnesty for Peace: Was There a Duty to Prosecute
International Crimes in Haiti?, 31 TEx. INT' LJ. 1, 12 n.81 (1996).
20. Truth commissions can lay the groundwork for eventual prosecutions, as the
Commission of Experts established by U.N. Security Council Resolution 780, U.N.
Vol. 29640
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commissions are a poor substitute for prosecutions. They do not have
prosecutory powers, such as the power to subpoena witnesses or punish
perjury. They are inherently vulnerable to politically imposed limitations
and manipulation: their structure, mandate, resources, access to informa-
tion, willingness or ability to take on sensitive cases, and strength of final
report are all largely determined by the political forces at play when they
are created. When truth commissions name perpetrators, they impose the
moral punishment of public condemnation, sometimes combined with the
sanction of lustration (the disqualification from public office); yet, because
of their institutional limitations, truth commissions do not provide those
named as perpetrators with the panoply of rights available to criminal
defendants.21 More importantly, truth commissions lack the transparency
of a criminal trial. As the U.S. Supreme Court has observed, "[t]o work
effectively, it is important that society's criminal process satisfy the appear-
ance of justice, and the appearance of justice can best be provided by
allowing people to observe it."22
The most authoritative rendering of truth is possible only through the
crucible of a trial that accords full due process. Criminal trials can gener-
ate a comprehensive record of the nature and extent of violations, how they
were planned and executed, the fate of individual victims, who gave the
orders, and who carried them out. Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson,
the Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg, said that one of the most important
legacies of the Nuremberg trials following World War 11 was that they doc-
umented the Nazi atrocities "with such authenticity and in such detail that
there can be no responsible denial of these crimes in the future and no
tradition of martyrdom of the Nazi leaders can arise among informed
people."2
In addition to truth, there is a responsibility to provide justice. Hold-
ing the violators criminally accountable for their acts is a duty owed to the
victims and their families. Prosecuting and punishing the violators would
give significance to the victims' suffering and serve as a partial remedy for
their injuries.24 Moreover, prosecutions "help restore victims' dignity and
SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/780 (1992), led to the creation of the Yugoslavia
Tribunal. The Commission of Experts established by U.N. Security Council Resolution
935, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/935 (1994), led to the creation of the
Rwanda Tribunal.
21. For a criticism of truth commissions, see generally Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen
Truth Commissions-1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study, in 1 TRANsrroNALJusTrIcE, supra
note 18, at 225.
22. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 556 (1980). In this way,
truth commissions resemble the oft-criticized "Star Chamber" that was once employed in
the United Kingdom. People cannot trust what they cannot see. As Justice Frankfurter
of the U.S. Supreme Court once stated, "fairness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-
sided determinations of fact, decisive of rights." Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
23. See Report to the President from Justice Robert H. Jackson, Chief of Counsel for
the United States in the Prosecution of Axis War Criminals (June 7, 1945), reprinted in
39 Am.J. INT'L L. 178, 184 (Supp. 1945).
24. Alice Henkin, Conference Report, in THE AsPEN INsTrruTE, STATE CRmIES: PUNISH-
MENT OR PARDON 3 (1989).
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prevent private acts of revenge by those who, in the absence of justice,
would take it into their own hands."25 Many analysts believe that national
reconciliation cannot take place as long as justice is foreclosed. 26
And yet, domestic prosecutions are often not a practical option, as in
Rwanda where domestic trials convened by the Tutsi government might be
seen as biased against the Hutus, who were responsible for the genocide of
500,000 Tutsis;27 or in Iraq, where the government of Saddam Hussein
cannot seriously be expected to prosecute diligently Iraqi leaders responsi-
ble for violations of international humanitarian law during the Persian Gulf
War and for the use of poison gas against the Kurds.26 Similarly, there was
no reason to believe that the Bosnian Serb government of Radavan Karadzic
would bring someone like Dusko Tadit to trial for murdering and torturing
prisoners at the Omarska prison camp in the Serb-controlled area of
Bosnia.29
This, then, is why the establishment of an international tribunal was
the best response to the atrocities in the former Yugoslavia. If the world
community is unable to prevent atrocities from occurring, it should at least
seek to prosecute the alleged perpetrators in an institution that is fair and
is perceived as fair.
Professor Epps asked why an international tribunal was created for
Yugoslavia but not for earlier large scale atrocities.30 The answer has to do
with the degree of the atrocities, as well as geography, public pressure, and
historic timing. In the summer of 1992, the world learned of the existence
of Serb-run concentration camps in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with conditions
reminiscent of the Nazi-run camps of World War II. Soon, daily reports of
acts of unspeakable barbarity committed in the Balkans began to fill the
pages of our newspapers. The city of Sarajevo, which had recently
impressed the world as host of the 1984 Winter Olympics, was trans-
formed from a symbol of ethnic harmony into a bloody killing field. For
the first time since World War II, genocide had returned to Europe. The
25. Tina Rosenberg, Overcoming the Legacies of Dictatorship, FoREIGN AFF., May-June
1995, at 134, 148, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
26. Dianne F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights
Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE LJ. 2537, 2550 n.44 (1991) (citing Hannah
Arendt's view that "men are unable to forgive what they cannot punish"). Prosecutions
act as a sort of ritual cleansing. A country in which such cleansing remains unfinished
will be plagued by continuous brooding and pondering. For example the French histo-
rian Henri Rousseau labels the case of postwar France, where the collaboration with the
Nazis was never fully tried, as a never ending neurosis. Luc Huyse, Justice After Transi-
tion: On the Choices Successor Elites Make in Dealing with the Past, in 1 TRANsmoNAL
JUSTICE, supra note 18, at 340.
27. See U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 4-5, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453 (1994)
(statement of New Zealand); id. at 16 (statement of Oman).
28. See John Norton Moore, War Crimes and the Rule of Law in the Gulf Crisis, 31 VA.
J. Ir'L L. 403 (1991).
29. See Indictment of Dusko Tadit before the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia: Indictments Against Meukic and Others and Tadit and Other, 34
I.L.M. 1011, 1028 (issued on February 2, 1995, and amended on September 1, 1995,
and December 14, 1995).
30. See supra Part I.
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international outcry was deafening. And the Security Council, which was
recently freed of its cold-war paralysis, was ready to respond.
Finally, let me respond to Professor Epps' assertion that the perma-
nent members of the Security Council would be unlikely to submit their
nationals "to the jurisdiction of an entity over which they do not have total
control."31 To some extent, they have already done so. Unlike the Nurem-
berg Tribunal, whose jurisdiction was restricted to crimes committed by
members of the Axis powers, the jurisdiction of the Yugoslavia Tribunal
extends to any person, regardless of nationality, alleged to have committed
violations of international humanitarian law in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia since 1991. Moreover, the Yugoslavia Tribunal is designed to
perform its prosecutorial and judicial functions independently of political
considerations and is not subject to the authority or control of the Security
Council.3 2 Thus, there is nothing to prevent the Tribunal from prosecuting
Russian, British, or American citizens that have participated as merce-
naries in the fighting in the former Yugoslavia, 33 or French, British, Rus-
sian, and American peacekeeping troops stationed in the former
Yugoslavia for any of the crimes referred to in the Tribunals Statute.
II. What Is Your Appraisal of the Statute and Rules of the Yugoslavia
Tribunal?
MICHAEL ScHAPF: As the first international criminal court in history, the
Nuremberg Tribunal provides the bench mark for assessing the fairness of
the Statute and Rules of the Yugoslavia Tribunal. The Yugoslavia Tribunal
itself acknowledged in its first annual report that "one can discern in the
statute and the rules a conscious effort to avoid some of the often-men-
tioned flaws of Nuremberg and Tokyo."34 And yet at least one commenta-
tor has concluded that the Yugoslavia Tribunal "will likely invite much of
the same criticisms that followed the first international war crimes
trials."35
In some respects, the Yugoslavia Tribunal is a vast improvement over
its predecessor. Its detailed rules of procedure and evidence, for example,
represent a tremendous advancement from the scant set of rules that were
fashioned for the Nuremberg Tribunal. Further, in contrast to the Nurem-
berg Tribunal, the Yugoslavia Tribunal prohibits trials in absentia, which
31. See supra Part I.
32. Report of the Secretary-General Containing the Statute of the International Tribu-
nal, reprinted in 2 Momus & ScIHAF, supra note 2, at 8.
33. CarolJ. Williams, Cold Cash Fuels Russian Fighting Spirit in Bosnia Mercenaries,
L.A. TiMEs, Apr. 12, 1993, at A8; Amos Perlmutter, Changing States in Bosnia's Final
Phase, WASH. TIMEs, June 22, 1995, at A21; Tony Smith, Serb Leader Offers to Close
Camps, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 9, 1992, at 1.
34. Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsi-
ble for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
Former Yugoslavia since 1991, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 152, at 24,
U.N. Doc. A/49/342 (1994) [hereinafter Annual Report of the International Tribunal].
35. Kevin R. Chaney, Pitfalls and Imperatives: Applying the Lessons of Nuremberg to
the Yugoslav War Crimes Trials, 14 Dicy. J. IINrL L. 57, 60 (1995).
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are inherently unfair and are likely to be seen as empty gestures. Whereas
defense attorneys at Nuremberg were denied full access to the Nuremberg
Tribunal's evidentiary archives,36 defendants before the Yugoslavia Tribu-
nal are entitled to any exculpatory evidence in the possession of the prose-
cutor, and both the prosecution and the defense are reciprocally bound to
disclose all documents and witnesses prior to trial.37 Finally, where the
Nuremberg Tribunal has been criticized for compelling defendants to make
incriminating statements, the Statute of the Yugoslavia Tribunal guarantees
every accused the right "not to be compelled to testify against himself or to
confess guilt," in addition to a panoply of other rights not recognized
under the Nuremberg Charter.38
The most often heard criticism of Nuremberg was its perceived appli-
cation of ex post facto laws, by holding persons responsible for the first
time in history for the "crime of aggression," and by applying the concept
of conspiracy-never before recognized in continental Europe. The creators
of the Yugoslavia Tribunal went to great lengths to avoid a similar percep-
tion with regard to the International Tribunal. First, the Security Council
adopted a series of resolutions that put the people of the former Yugoslavia
on notice that they were bound by existing international humanitarian law,
in particular the Geneva Conventions. The resolutions enumerated the var-
ious types of reported acts that would amount to breaches of this law, and
warned that persons who commit or order the commission of such
breaches would be held individually responsible. Second, the jurisdiction
of the International Tribunal is defined on the basis of the highest standard
of applicable law, customary law, in order to avoid any question of full
respect for the principle nullem crimen sine lege. It is particularly notewor-
thy that the crime of waging a war of aggression, which engendered so
much criticism after Nuremberg, is not within the Yugoslavia Tribunal's
jurisdiction.
In other respects, the Yugoslavia Tribunal's record is a mixed one. Let
us begin with the criticism that Nuremberg constituted "victor's justice."
In contrast to Nuremberg, the Yugoslavia Tribunal was created neither by
the victors nor the parties to the conflict, but rather by the United Nations,
representing the international community of states.39 The judges of the
Yugoslavia Tribunal come from all parts of the world, and are elected by
the General Assembly.40
On the other hand, the decision to establish the Yugoslavia Tribunal
was made by the U.N. Security Council, which has not remained a neutral
third party, but rather has been deeply involved in the conflict. The Secur-
ity Council has imposed sanctions on the side perceived to be most respon-
sible for the conflict,41 authorized the use of force and air strikes, 42 and
36. Id. at 89.
37. Annual Report of the International Tribunal, supra note 34, at 24.
38. See Tribunal's Statute, supra note 3, art. 21, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 1198-99.
39. MoRius & ScHARw, supra note 2, at 332.
40. Tribunars Statute, supra note 3, arts. 12 & 13, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 1195-96.
41. S.C. Res. 757, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/757 (1992).
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sent in tens of thousands of peacekeeping personnel.4 3 Its numerous reso-
lutions have been ignored and many of its peacekeeping troops have been
injured or killed; some have even been held hostage. Moreover, throughout
the conflict, the Security Council has (justifiably) favored the Bosnian Mus-
lims and Croatians over the Serbs. Although it imposed sweeping eco-
nomic sanctions on Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs, such action was never
even proposed when Croatian forces committed similar acts of ethnic
cleansing in central Bosnia in October 1993. Throughout the conflict, the
Council had been quite vocal in its condemnation of Serb atrocities, but its
criticism of Muslim and Croatian atrocities was muted.
Although the Yugoslavia Tribunal is designed to be independent from
the Security Council, one cannot ignore the facts that the Security Council
selected the Tribunal's prosecutor and proposed a short list of judges from
which the General Assembly chose. Indeed, given that the battle for con-
trol of Bosnia was in large measure a religious war between Bosnian Mus-
lims and Bosnian Serbs, it is astonishing that four of the eleven judges
elected by the General Assembly upon the nomination of the Council come
from states with predominantly Muslim populations.44 In contrast, the
nominee for the Tribunal's bench from Russia (the one state with the clos-
est historic ties to Serbia) was defeated ostensibly to avoid a pro-Serb
bias.4 5
While the Tribunal has jurisdiction to prosecute anyone responsible
for violations of international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia,
the indictments so far have been overwhelmingly against Serbs; not one
Muslim was included among the first fifty-two people indicted by the Tri-
bunal. Recently, the prosecutor of the Tribunal announced that he would
make a concerted effort to indict a Muslim, to show the parties that the
Tribunal was not one-sided. Yet, this patently political move in itself taints
the Tribunal's due process.
42. See, e.g., S.C. Res: 770, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/770 (1992)
(authorizing force to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Bosnia); S.C.
Res. 816, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/816 (1993) (authorizing force to
enforce the no fly zone over Bosnia); S.C. Res. 820, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/
RES/820 (1993) (authorizing measures to prevent violations of economic sanctions
imposed on Serbia).
43. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 761, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/761 (1992)
(dispatching peacekeepers to ensure the security of Sarajevo airport); S.C. Res. 762, U.N.
SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/762 (1992) (dispatching peacekeepers to "pink
zones" in Croatia); S.C. Res. 776, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/776 (1992)
(dispatching peacekeepers to other parts of Bosnia to facilitate delivery of aid); S.C. Res.
819, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/819 (1993) (dispatching peacekeepers to
"safe areas" in Bosnia).
44. Georges Michel Abi-Saab (Egypt), Adolphus Godwin Karibi-Whyte (Nigeria),
Rustam S. Sidhwa (Pakistan), and Lal Chand Bohrah (Malaysia). None of the judges,
however, is a Muslim. Cf. Brutal Conflict: "An Affront to the World's Conscience," U.N.
CHRON., Dec. 1993, at 28.
45. See Boris Krivoshei & Serbei Staroselsky, Russia Will Obey Tribunal on War
Crimes in Yugoslavia, TASS, Sept. 24, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws
File.
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Finally, noting China's dismal human rights record, one commentator
has likened China's participation as a permanent member of the Security
Council in the establishment of the Tribunal, the selection of its prosecu-
tor, and the nomination of its judges, to Russia's presence on the Nurem-
berg Tribunal.46 As long as the jurisdiction of ad hoc tribunals is triggered
by a decision of the Security Council, and the prosecutors and judges are
selected by the Council, such tribunals will be susceptible to the criticism
that they are not completely neutral. This is one of the reasons why the
eventual establishment of a permanent international criminal court is so
important.
Nuremberg was also criticized for selective prosecution and failure to
bring many guilty individuals to justice. The Yugoslavia Tribunal has a
similarly small capacity to conduct trials. "As there are only two Trial
Chambers sharing, together with the Appeals Chamber, a single court-
room, a crucial and difficult area of prosecutorial policy is to ensure that
only the most appropriate cases are referred to trial."47 In a way, this criti-
cism is actually magnified with respect to the Yugoslavia Tribunal's
approach to prosecutions. Because of lack of evidence and custody over
offenders, the Yugoslavia Tribunal has been unable to start with cases
against the military and political leaders, as was done in Nuremberg.48
Indeed, the first person to be tried before the Yugoslavia Tribunal,
Dusko Tadit, was not a senior official, but a lowly part-time prison guard.
The office of the prosecutor has justified the decision to begin with the
Tadit prosecution as follows: "We think prosecutions of prison guards and
others like them have a significant symbolic value and that it is our obliga-
tion to pursue some of them."49 As with Nuremberg, subsequent national
prosecutions are expected to deal with the vast majority of those responsi-
ble for atrocities in the former Yugoslavia, and it is likely that many will
escape the net of justice.
Another criticism of Nuremberg was that those acquitted by the Tribu-
nal were retried and convicted in subsequent proceedings before national
courts. The Statute of the Yugoslavia Tribunal, in contrast, expressly pro-
tects defendants against double jeopardy by prohibiting national courts
from retrying persons who have been tried by the International Tribunal.50
However, by permitting the Tribunal's prosecutor to appeal an acquittal,51
the Tribunal itself may infringe the accused's interest in finality which
46. Chaney, supra note 35, at 82. Nuremberg has been criticized on the basis of
"unclean hands" because Soviet judges convicted defendants for waging aggressive war
and mistreating prisoners, despite the forcible Soviet annexation of the Baltic States and
the appalling Soviet treatment of POWs.
47. Second Annual Report of the International Tribunal, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/50/365 (1995).
48. Minna Schrag, The Yugoslav Crimes Tribunal: A Prosecutor's View, 6 DUKE J.
COMP. & IN'L L. 187, 191 (1995).
49. Id. at 193.
50. Tribunal's Statute, supra note 3, art. 10(1), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 1195.
51. Id. art. 25, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 1199-1200.
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underlies the double jeopardy principle. 52
A final criticism of Nuremberg was that it did not provide for the right
of appeal. The Statute of the Yugoslavia Tribunal has been recognized as
constituting a major advancement over Nuremberg by guaranteeing the
right of appeal and providing for a separate court of appeal. However, the
procedure for the selection of judges by the General Assembly did not dif-
ferentiate between trial and appellate judges, leaving the judges themselves
to decide. When they arrived at the Hague, this became the subject of an
acrimonious debate, since nearly all the judges wished to be appointed to
the appeals chamber, which was viewed as the more prestigious assign-
ment. As a compromise, the judges agreed that assignments would be for
an initial period of one year and subject to "rotat[ion] on a regular basis"
thereafter. 53
The rotation principle adopted by the judges is at odds with the provi-
sions of the Tribunal's Statute, which was intended to maintain a clear dis-
tinction between the two levels of jurisdiction. Article 12 provides that
there shall be three judges in each trial chamber and five judges in the
appeals chamber, and article 14(3) expressly states that a judge shall serve
only in the chamber to which he or she is assigned. These provisions were
intended to ensure the right of an accused to have an adverse judgment and
sentence in a criminal case reviewed by "a higher tribunal according to
law," as required by article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR).5 4 The purpose of the double degree of jurisdic-
tion principle, under which judges of equal rank do not review each other's
decisions, is to avoid "undermining the integrity of the appeals process as a
result of the judges' hesitancy to reverse decisions in order to avoid the
future reversal of their own decisions."55 The rotation principle, therefore,
undermines the Yugoslavia Tribunal's appellate process.
52. The U.S. Constitution's prohibition of double jeopardy prevents the appeal of
acquittals by the prosecution. The prohibition is not against being twice punished, but
against being twice forced to stand trial for the same offense. There are two important
rationales for this rule. One rationale is that the trial itself is a great ordeal, and once
the defendant has been acquitted the ordeal must end. See United States v. Ball, 163
U.S. 662, 669 (1896). The other is based on the increased risk of an erroneous convic-
tion that may occur if the state, with its superior resources, were allowed to retry an
individual until it finally obtained a conviction. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S.
184, 187-88 (1957); United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 130 (1980). These
rationales are just as applicable to prosecution before an international criminal court as
to domestic prosecutions. The International Tribunal's prosecutor, together with state
authorities assisting the prosecutor, will have the full resources of the court and several
interested states behind it, while defendants and their counsel will be acting alone to
refute guilt.
53. Rule 27 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (adopted on 11 February 1994,
amended on 5 May 1994 and 4 October 1993, and further revised on 30January 1995),
U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.3, reprinted in Moius & ScHAu, supra note 2, at 41.
54. International Covenant on Civil and Politicial Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, reprinted
in 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967) (adopted by G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16,
at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316, and entered into force March 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
55. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Fifth Session,
U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 333, U.N. Doc. A/48/10 (1993).
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In sum, although the Yugoslavia Tribunal's Statute and Rules generally
represent a great improvement over Nuremberg, there are some built-in
flaws. As discussed below, several of these flaws have been magnified by
the Tribunal's first decisions interpreting the Statute and Rules.
VALERiE Epps: This is not the appropriate forum to undertake a com-
prehensive review of the Tribunal's Statute and Rules but let me pick out a
few features that are worthy of comment. Professor Scharf mentioned that
the Statute prohibits trials in absentia.56 The U.N. Secretary-General
argued that such trials would violate article 14(3)(d) of the ICCPR, which
provides that everyone charged with a criminal offense "shall be entitled to
the following minimum guarantee[s] . . .(d) To be tried in his presence,
and to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own
choosing .... -57 The requirement that the defendant be present is per-
haps emphasized by the fact that article 14(1) provides for "a fair and pub-
lic hearing" but states that:
[t]he Press and the public may be excluded from all or part of a trial for
reasons of morals, public order (ordre public) or national security in a demo-
cratic society, or when the interest of the private lives of the parties so
requires, or .. .where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice
58
No similar provision exists for the exclusion of the defendant, suggesting
that the defendant must be present at trial. Nonetheless, the lack of in
absentia trials has been criticized. Professor Ruth Wedgwood has argued
that article 14 clearly gives defendants "[A] right to be present if they wish
to be, and to have full notice of the proceedings .... But if the defendant
voluntarily chooses to absent himself, I question whether the United
Nations is wise-certainly it is not required-to prevent the proof of the
offense."59 The point is arguable, but in general I must agree that the spec-
ter of in absentia trials is not a pleasant one. Given that the Dayton
Accords60 and the Tribunal's Statute6 ' require all states to cooperate fully
with the Tribunal, theoretically there should be no need for in absentia tri-
als except for those defendants who cannot be found.
The prohibition of in absentia trials may be ameliorated by the availa-
bility of the so-called "super-indictment." The super-indictment procedure
is spelled out in Tribunal rule 61,62 which provides that after an indict-
56. Tribunal's Statute, supra note 3, art. 24, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 1199.
57. ICCPR, supra note 54, reprinted in 6 I.L.M at 272-73.
58. Id., reprinted in 6 I.L.M. at 372.
59. Ruth Wedgwood, Symposium: War Crimes: Bosnia and Beyond, War Crimes in the
Former Yugoslavia: Comments on the International War Crimes Tribunal, 34 VA. J. INT'L L.
267, 269 (1994).
60. General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with
Annexes, Art. VI, reprinted in 35 LL.M. 75, 97 (1996), and The Dayton Agreement on
Implementing the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 170, 172
(1996).
61. Tribunal's Statute, supra note 3, art. 29, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 1200.
62. The adoption of rules of procedure and evidence is authorized by article 15 of
the Tribunals Statute, supra note 3, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 1196. The Tribunal adopted
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ment has been confirmed by a judge of the Tribunal, a warrant for the
accused's arrest will be sent to his/her home state. If that state is unable to
execute the warrant, the prosecutor must take all reasonable steps to effect
personal service or otherwise to inform the accused of the indictment. If
the accused has still not surrendered to the Tribunal, the indictment and all
supporting evidence must be submitted to the trial chamber in open court.
The prosecutor may also examine any witnesses whose statements are part
of the record. If the trial chamber is satisfied that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the accused has committed the crimes listed in the
indictment, it shall so determine and shall also issue to all states an inter-
national arrest warrant for the accused.
The procedures outlined in rule 61 ensure that there will be a public
record of the alleged crimes of the defendant, together with supporting evi-
dence. This procedure insures that the accused will become an interna-
tional pariah, even if s/he eludes arrest.
Two other matters worth mentioning are that the Statute does not pro-
vide for a jury system, and that the verdict rendered by the three member
trial panel does not have to be unanimous. 63 Though a jury trial is a crea-
ture of the common law and is absent in many legal systems, it is seen as a
great buffer between the powerful machinery of the state or the interna-
tional community and the relatively powerless defendant. In the interna-
tional context the procedure for picking a representative jury would either
be so cumbersome as to outweigh its benefits or would literally be impossi-
ble. Requiring unanimity of a three-member panel, however, does not
seem too much to expect. While it is true that the rule of unanimity for
juries has been eviscerated in national courts,64 this generally involves
juries composed of more than three persons. Given the superior education
and legal knowledge of the Tribunal's judges, the Statute or Rules should
require a unanimous verdict for conviction.
The Tribunal's Statute permits an appeal by the defendant from a
guilty verdict,65 which conforms to a similar requirement of article 14(5) of
the ICCPR. What is more remarkable is that the Statute permits appeal by
the prosecutor after a verdict of not guilty. 66 Given that the Security Coun-
cil created the Tribunal and selected the prosecutor, and that the General
Assembly selected the judges from a Security Council short list, it would
seem fair to let a verdict of not guilty stand without a right of prosecutorial
appeal. If indeed there has been some error of law it will not be of the
defendant's making and there seems to be no reason to put the defendant
through the whole process again.
rules of procedure and evidence on February 11, 1994. These rules came into force on
March 14, 1994. Rule 61, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 493, 519-20 (1994).
63. Tribunal's Statute, supra note 3, art. 23(2), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 1199.
64. See, e.g., Apodoca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406
U.S. 356, 363-65 (1972); McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990); cf. Ballew v.
Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 24041 (1978); Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979).
65. Tribunars Statute, supra note 3, arts. 25 & 26, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1199-1200.
66. Id.
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With respect to sentencing, the most controversial aspect of the Tribu-
nal's Statute is the lack of the death sentence.67 Many in the human rights
community believe that customary international law already prohibits the
death penalty for most crimes, 68 although about one-half of all states still
permit such punishment. Before the Balkan War, Yugoslavia imposed the
death penalty.69 When a tribunal similar to that in Yugoslavia was set up
for Rwanda, 70 the Rwandan authorities were considerably distressed. They
pointed out that alleged war criminals tried in Rwandan national courts
could be sentenced to death, whereas offenders handed over to the interna-
tional court could not.
The pardoning or commutation power articulated in article 2871 of the
Yugoslav Tribunal's Statute provides that the president of the Tribunal has
the power to commute or pardon anyone convicted by the Tribunal to the
extent permitted by the law of the country where the convicted defendant is
imprisoned. This provision makes the convict's eligibility for pardon or
commutation depend upon the happenstance of the laws of the country in
which s/he is serving a sentence. It may be that the president of the Tribu-
nal will exercise this power sparingly or in a way that results in its rela-
tively uniform application, but it would certainly have been preferable to
include a provision for pardon or commutation equally applicable to all
prisoners.
The Statute of the Tribunal names four substantive categories of law
under which defendants may be charged: grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949, violations of the laws or customs of war, genocide,
and crimes against humanity.72 Each of these categories presents hurdles
to prosecution. Common article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 for-
bids a variety of activities, even "[iun the case of armed conflict not an inter-
national character." 73 Article 3 states:
67. Id. art. 24, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 1199 (limiting penalties imposed by the trial
chamber to imprisonment).
68. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. ScHABAs, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN INTERNA.
TIONAL LAw (1993); David Weissbrodt, Execution of Juvenile Offenders by the United
States Violates International Human Rights Law, 2 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 33 (1988);
Joan F. Hartman, Unusual Punishment: The Domestic Effects of International Norms
Restricting the Application of the Death Penalty, 52 U. C. L. REv. 655, 699 (1983).
69. The criminal code of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has frequent imposi-
tions of capital punishment, excerpts of which are reproduced in M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI &
PER MANIKAs, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOsLAVIA 679 (1996).
70. S.C. Res. 995, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/995 (1994).
71. If pursuant to the applicable law of the State in which the convicted person is
imprisoned, he or she is eligible for pardon or commutation of sentence, the
State concerned shall notify the International Tribunal accordingly. The Presi-
dent of the International Tribunal, in consultation with the judges, shall decide
the matter on the basis of the interests of justice and the general principles of
law.
Tribunal's Statute, supra note 3, art. 28, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 1200.
72. Id. arts. 2-5, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 1192-94.
73. See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3515, 3518, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
(entered into force Oct. 21, 1950) [hereinafter Geneva Convention].
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Persons taking no active part in the hostilities ...shall . . . be treated
humanely... land] the following acts are ... prohibited at any time and in
any place...
(a) violence to life and person...
(b) taking of hostages ...
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrad-
ing treatment;
(d) the... carrying out of executions without previous judgment pro-
nounced by a regularly constituted court .... 74
Violations of any of the above provisions would be a useful starting point
for prosecutions, but under article 2 of the Tribunars Statute only "grave
breaches" may be prosecuted. A "grave breach" can only be conunitted
against a person protected by the Convention; that is, only a person of a
nationality different from that of the perpetrator. 75 Thus, the slaughter or
rape of a Bosnian Muslim by a Bosnian Serb is not a grave breach. The
appeals chamber has now ruled on the scope of this article and has con-
cluded that it only refers to offenses occurring in the context of interna-
tional armed conflict. 76 Offenses occurring during a civil war cannot be
prosecuted under this article.
The Tribunal's Statute also permits prosecution for violation of the
customary laws of war, listing offenses such as "wanton destruction of cit-
ies, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity."7 7
It would be a poor military strategist who could not devise some military
necessity for attack. Proving that there was no military necessity presents
all the inherent difficulties of proving a negative. Some of the more distres-
sing acts of the Balkan war, such as the systematic rape of women, are not
specifically mentioned as violations of the laws or customs of war.
Although it is clear that the list of offenses in article 3 was not meant to be
exhaustive, and although it has been cogently argued that systematic rape
does violate the customary laws of war, it would have been better to pro-
hibit such acts explicitly.78 Rape is, however, mentioned under article 5 as
an example of a crime against humanity.
Article 2 of the Genocide Convention defines genocide as the commis-
sion of any of a specific list of acts "with intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group,"79 and the Tribunal's
Statute adopts this definition.80 Proving this very specific intent will be
74. Id. art. 3.
75. Id. art. 4: "Persons protected by the Convention are those who, at a given
moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupa-
tion, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not
nationals ..."
76. See infra text accompanying notes 107-08.
77. Tribunars Statute, supra note 3, art. 3(b), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 1192.
78. Bassiouni and Manikas conclude that the omission of crimes of sexual violence
from article 3 will make it impossible to prosecute for rape under this article. BAssioum
& MA=As, supra note 69, at 510.
79. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78
U.N.T.S. 277, adopted through G.A. Res. 2670, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 174, U.N.
Doc. A/810 (1948) (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951).
80. Tribunal's Statute, supra note 3, art. 4, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 1193.
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difficult. For example, it is not enough that members of one of the speci-
fied groups are killed. It must also be shown that the killing was carried
out with the specific intent to kill the victims because they were members
of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group rather than, for example,
simply being the enemy in a war, civil or otherwise.81
It is uncertain whether "crimes against humanity" have been suffi-
ciently defined in a civil war context so as not to run afoul of the condem-
nation against the application of an ex post facto law.8 2 At Nuremberg such
offenses were limited to those committed "in execution of or in connection
with" war crimes and crimes against peace. 83 The unknown dimensions of
the phrase "crimes against humanity" in the current context raises issues of
the sufficiency of prior notice of the nature of the offenses condemned.
The appeals chamber has ruled upon this matter and has determined that
such crimes can occur in armed conflict both of an internal character and
of an international character.84
In general, it would be preferable to have a pre-existing, well-defined
substantive statute, together with extant rules of evidence and procedure,
as well as an existing court. Obviously no such institution, statute, or rules
existed at the time of the outbreak of the Yugoslav war. The hurdles out-
lined above will have to be overcome or they will operate as a bar or even an
insuperable hurdle to the prosecution of those indicted. Deciding how to
overcome these obstacles may contribute to the creation of a better defined
international criminal legal system, and may help persuade the interna-
tional community to create a permanent international criminal court.
III. What Is Your Appraisal of the Tribunal's First Decisions on the
Pre-Trial Motions in the Tadit Case?
MICHAEL SCHARF: As mentioned earlier, the first defendant before the Tri-
bunal is Dusko Tadit, who is accused of killing, raping and torturing
numerous civilians in the Omarska internment camp. In a preliminary
motion, Tadit challenged the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The prosecution,
in turn, filed a motion for protection of the identity of witnesses to be used
in the Tadid case. On August 10, 1995, the trial chamber denied the
defense motion, and the appeals chamber subsequently upheld the trial
81. See BAssiouNi & MANiKAs, supra note 69, at 527-30. The Tribunal's rule 93 pro-
vides that "[e]vidence of a consistent pattern of conduct may be admissible in the inter-
ests of justice." 33 I.L.M. at 535 (1994). Such evidence may permit an inference of
intent.
82. In their commentary on article 5, Bassiouni and Manikas state: "Article 5 is a
progressive codification of Article 6(c) of the [International Military Tribunal] Charter.
Article 5 of the Statute is progressive because it goes beyond the normative provisions of
the Charter in several ways." BAssioumi & MAwKAms, supra note 69, at 545.
83. See Prosecutor v. Tadid, IT-94-1-AR72, 77 (1995) (App. Chamb., Int'l Trib. for
the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Int'l Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of Former Yugo. since 1991), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32, 57
(1996) [hereinafter Prosecutor v. Tadie I1].
84. See infra text accompanying notes 115-16.
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chamber's decision.8 5 That same day, the trial chamber upheld the prose-
cution's motion in part, holding that the identity of several witnesses could
be withheld indefinitely from the defendant in order to protect them and
their families from retribution.8 6
There are some very troubling aspects to the Tribunal's disposition of
these preliminary motions. Let us begin with Tadit's challenge to the Tri-
bunal's jurisdiction. In its proposal for the Tribunal's Statute, the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross, the world's leading authority on
international humanitarian law, "underline[d] the fact that, according to
International Humanitarian Law as it stands today, the notion of war
crimes is limited to situations of international armed conflict."8 7 Seizing
upon this authoritative statement, Tadit challenged the lawfulness of his
indictment under article 2 (grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions) and
article 3 (violations of the customs of war) of the Tribunal's Statute on the
ground that there was no international armed conflict in the region of
Prijedor, where the crimes with which he was charged were allegedly
committed.
In what can only be described as a novel interpretation, the Yugoslavia
Tribunal's appeals chamber decided by a four-to-one vote that, although
article 2 of the Tribunal's Statute applied only in international armed con-
flicts, article 3 applied to war crimes "regardless of whether they are com-
mitted in internal or international armed conflicts." 88 The Tribunal based
its decision on its perception of the trend in international law in which "the
distinction between interstate wars and civil wars is losing its value as far
as human beings are concerned."8 9
While distinguished commentators such as Professors Meron and
Paust have argued convincingly for acceptance of individual responsibility
for violations of the Geneva Conventions and the protocols additional
thereto in the context of internal armed conflict,90 such recognition would
constitute progressive development of international law, rather than
acknowledgment of an existing rule. In addition to the ex post facto criti-
85. See Prosecutor v. Tadi , No. IT-94-1-T (1995) (Trial Chamb., Int'l Trib. for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Int'l Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of Former Yugo. since 1991), affd, No. IT-94-1-AR72, supra
note 83 [hereinafter Prosecutor v. Tadie fl.
86. See Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion Requesting Protective Measures for Vic-
tims and Wimesses, Prosecutor v. Tadit, No. IT-94-1-T (1995) (Trial Chamb., Int'l Trib.
for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Int'l Humanitarian
Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugo. since 1991) [hereinafter Decision on
Prosecutor's Motion].
87. Some Preliminary Remarks by the International Committee of the Red Cross on the
Setting Up of an International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Seri-
ous Violation of International Humanitarian Law Committed on the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia (Feb. 22, 1993), reprinted in 2 MoRRIS & ScH-.aU, supra note 2, at 391 (empha-
sis added).
88. Prosector v. Tadie II, supra note 83, at 68.
89. Id. at 54.
90. See Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 Am. J.
INT'L L. 554 (1995);Jordan Paust, Applicability of International Criminal Laws to Events in
the Former Yugoslavia, 9 AM. U. J. INr'L L. & POL'y 499, 521-22 (1994).
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cism, there is a second important reason for the Tribunal to exercise
greater caution in construing its jurisdiction: states will not have faith in
the integrity of the Tribunal as a precedent for other ad hoc tribunals and
for a permanent international criminal court if the Tribunal is perceived as
prone to expansive interpretations of its jurisdiction.
Let us turn next to the decision of the trial court, which held that the
identity of several witnesses could be withheld indefinitely from the
defendant and his counsel throughout the trial in order to protect the wit-
nesses and their families from retribution.91 There are two problems with
this decision. First, the Tribunal decided to elevate the protection of vic-
tims above the accused's right of confrontation, notwithstanding the fact
that article 20 of the Tribunal's Statute requires that proceedings be con-
ducted "with full respect for the rights of the accused," and with merely
"due regard for the protection of victims and witnesses." Simply put, the
right to examine or cross-examine witnesses cannot be effective without the
right to know the identity of adverse witnesses. As one noted commentator
has stated, "It is an almost impossible task to cross-examine an adverse
witness effectively without knowing that witness' name, background, habit-
ual residence, or whereabouts at the time of the events to which he
testifies."92
Second, the Yugoslavia Tribunal rationalized its decision on the
ground that the Tribunal is "comparable to a military Tribunal" which has
more "limited rights of due process and more lenient rules of evidence." 93
It then cited favorably the practice of the Nuremberg Tribunal to admit
hearsay evidence and ex parte affidavits with greater frequency than would
be appropriate in domestic trials.94 What the Tribunal apparently failed to
realize is that this practice has in fact been a lightening rod for criticism of
the Nuremberg Tribunal. 95
Consequently, the initial jurisprudence of the Yugoslavia Tribunal has,
unfortunately, not been above reproach. To paraphrase Justice RobertJack-
son, the Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg, if we pass the defendants in an
international trial a poisoned chalice, it is the international community
that is ultimately injured. For the record upon which we judge those
before the Yugoslavia Tribunal today will be the record upon which history
judges the broader effort to prosecute crimes before international
tribunals. 96
91. Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion, supra note 86. See also Monroe Leigh, The
Yugoslav Tribunal: Use of Unnamed Witnesses Against Accused, 90 Am. J. INT'L L. 235, 236
(1996) (discussing case).
92. Leigh, supra note 91, at 236.
93. Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion, supra note 86, at 15.
94. Id.
95. See TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TIALS 174, 241 (1992);
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE, REPORT ON THE
PROPOSED RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL TO ADJUDI.
CATE WAR CRIMES COMMITrED IN THE FORMER YUGoStAvA 27 (1995).
96. Robert H. Jackson, The Case Against the Nazi War Criminals, Opening State-
ment for the United States of America, Nov. 21, 1945.
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VALERIE Epps: Before the trial chamber, Tadi's attorneys mounted a
radical attack challenging the legality of the creation of the Tribunal and
arguing that the Tribunal lacked primary jurisdiction over national courts
as well as subject matter jurisdiction. The trial chamber had dismissed on
the merits Tadit's motions relating to primary jurisdiction and subject mat-
ter jurisdiction, and had decided that it lacked the power to consider the
question of the legality of its own creation. Tadit appealed from that deci-
sion and the appeals chamber considered all three issues on their merits.
97
Perhaps the most surprising part of the appeals chamber's decision
was its willingness to consider the legality of its creation by the Security
Council under the Security Council's chapter VII powers. The prosecutor
argued that the "Tribual is not a constitutional court set up to scrutinise the
actions of organs of the United Nations," and the trial chamber agreed.98
The appeals chamber considered that issue "beside the point" and tried to
reframe the question as "whether the International Tribunal . . . can
examine the legality of its establishment by the Security Council, solely for
the purpose of ascertaining its own 'primary' jurisdiction over the case
before it."99 This is a nice distinction, but it resulted in a thorough investi-
gation by the appeals chamber of the Security Council's powers under
chapter VII and articles 39, 40, 41 and 42 of the United Nations Charter. It
concluded that "the International Tribunal has been established in accord-
ance with the appropriate procedures under the United Nations Char-
ter." 100 The appeals chamber's interpretation of particular U.N. Charter
articles is of less importance than the fact that the chamber considered
itself empowered to address such questions.
The tradition of judicial supremacy is well-known and widely revered
in the American context,101 but in no other governmental system is the
highest court given such broad powers to decide upon the scope of the
powers of other branches of government and to pronounce, in cases before
it, that the legislature or the executive has overstepped the bounds of its
permissible powers. Most systems operate under a parliamentary or execu-
tive supremacy system or with strictly limited powers of judicial review.
Though the merits phase in the Lockerbie case is still pending before
the International Court of Justice, that court, in its decision on Libya's
request for interim measures of protection, made it clear that it was not
going to investigate the legality of the Security Council resolutions
10 2
ordering Libya to hand over, either to the United Kingdom or to the United
States, the suspects wanted in connection with the bombing of Pan Am
97. Prosecutor v. Tadie II, supra note 83, reprinted in 35 I.L.M. at 32.
98. Id. at 40.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 48.
101. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
102. S.C. Res. 731, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/731, reprinted in 31
I.L.M. 731, 732 (1992); S.C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 749
(1992).
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Flight 103 over Scotland. 10 3 Although some members of the court were
careful to point out that the case was simply a ruling on the primacy of
mandatory Security Council resolutions over other, possibly conflicting,
treaty obligations, it remains true that the court could, with little effort,
have turned the case into a Marbury v. Madison equivalent by ruling on the
legality of the Security Council's resolutions. In the Lockerbie case, the
International Court of Justice chose not to take that route, whereas the
appeals chamber in Tadid took the issue of the scope of the powers of the
Security Council by the horns and ruled that the Security Council did in
fact have the power to create the Tribunal. The power to decide that a
particular organ has operated within the scope of its mandate implies the
power to announce that the organ has overstepped its mandate and has
operated illegally.
This is not the forum for a careful analysis of the possible justifica-
tions or consequences of a doctrine of judicial supremacy within the U.N.
system. Suffice it to say that since the ultimate enforcement of the Tribu-
nal's judgments lies within the power of the Security Council, it would
seem unlikely that the U.N. Charter would have intended to vest judicial
supremacy in a tribunal created by the Security Council, or that such
power should be implied from any possible "inherent" powers. Nor does it
seem a sensible allocation of powers.
The appeals chamber's decision on the Tribunal's primacy over
national courts is, perhaps, less controversial. The chamber's decision was
based on various articles of the U.N. Charter104 and specific provisions of
the Tribunal's Statute. 10 5 Indeed if a defendant could elude trial by insist-
ing on being tried in national courts, defendants might well end up in
highly sympathetic court systems.
The third ground of appeal was based on Tadit's allegation that arti-
cles 2, 3 and 5 of the Tribunal's Statute, under which he was tried, only
relate to crimes committed in the context of an international armed con-
flict, whereas Tadit insisted that his alleged crimes occurred in an internal
armed conflict. The trial chamber had concluded that "the notion of inter-
national armed conflict was not a jurisdictional criterion of Article 2 and
that Articles 3 and 5 each apply to both internal and international armed
conflicts."10 6
The appeals chamber disagreed with the trial chamber on its interpre-
tation of article 2 of the Statute. 10 7 The appeals chamber recognized that
"Article 2 refers to 'grave breaches' of the Geneva Conventions of 1949,
103. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention
arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K.; Libya v. U.S.), 1992 I.CJ. 3
(provisional measures, orders of April 14).
104. See, e.g., U.N. CHARr arts. 2(1), 2(7), 24 & 37.
105. See, e.g., Tribunal's Statute, supra note 3, art. 9(2), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 1194.
106. Prosecutor v. Tadie II, supra note 83, reprinted in 35 I.L.M. at 53.
107. The Tribunal's Statute provides:
Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons commit-
ting or ordering to be committed grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of
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which are widely understood to be committed only in international armed
conflicts."108 Although the chamber recognized that there may be some
indications that the community of states is beginning to change its view on
this matter, it nonetheless concluded that article 2 was limited to interna-
tional armed conflicts.
With respect to articles 3109 and 5,110 the appeals chamber consid-
ered the proceedings of the Security Council when it discussed the juris-
diction of the Tribunal, and concluded that the Council believed that the
Yugoslav conflict was both an international and an internal armed conflict
and "intended to empower the International Tribunal to adjudicate viola-
12 August 1949, namely the following acts against persons or property pro-
tected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention:
(a) wilful killing;
(b) torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments;
(c) wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health;
(d) extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by
military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;
(e) compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the forces of a
hostile power;
(f) wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of the rights of fair and
regular trial;
(g) unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a civilian;
(h) taking civilians as hostages.
Tribunals Statute, supra note 3, reprinted in 32 IL.M. at 1192.
108. 35 I.L.M. 32, 55 (1996).
109. Article 3 of the Tribunals Statute, supra note 3, reprinted in 32 IL.M. at 1192-93,
provides:
Violations of the laws or customs of war
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons violating
the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to:
(a) employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons calculated to
cause unnecessary suffering;
(b) wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justi-
fied by military necessity;
(c) attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended towns, vil-
lages, dwellings, or buildings;
(d) seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated
to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, historic monu-
ments and works of art and science;
(e) plunder of public or private property.
110. Article 5 of the Tribunal's Statute, supra note 3, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 1193-94,
provides:
Crimes against humanity
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsi-
ble for the following crimes when committed in armed conflict, whether interna-








(h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds;
(i) other inhumane acts.
Cornell International Law Journal
tions of humanitarian law that occurred in either context."111 The appeals
chamber ruled that "Article 3 is intended to... endow.., the International
Tribunal with the power to prosecute all 'serious violations' of international
humanitarian law"112 and that "it does not matter whether the 'serious
violation' has occurred within the context of an international or an internal
armed conflict."113 Though the chamber cited historic and contemporary
practice extensively, there is an argument to be made that the chamber's
view represents the progressive development of the law rather than lege
lata.114 If such is the case, the ex post facto argument gains much ground.
It is perhaps significant that article 5 indicates that the listed crimes can be
prosecuted regardless of whether the conflict is internal or international,
whereas article 3 contains no such statement.
Article 5 of the Tribunal's Statute confers jurisdiction over crimes
against humanity and specifically provides the power to prosecute for the
listed crimes "when committed in armed conflict, whether international or
internal in character." 115 Despite this explicit language, Tadit argued that
just as the jurisdiction of the Nuremberg Tribunal over crimes against
humanity required that such crimes be committed in the execution of, or in
connection with, crimes against peace or war crimes, thus limiting jurisdic-
tion to offenses committed in the context of an international armed con-
flict, so current customary law also requires a nexus with an international
armed conflict. To rule otherwise, he argued, would violate the principle of
nullum crimen sine lege. The chamber rejected this argument partly
because of the specific language of the Statute, and partly because of its
conviction that customary law now made it clear that crimes against
humanity do not require an international armed conflict context. Although
the article 5 proposals submitted by a number of states and bar associa-
tions did not seek to require that crimes against humanity be committed in
an international context, it is far from clear whether the absence of such a
nexus represents the progressive development or crystallization of current
customary law." 6
Finally, I agree with Professor Scharf that the trial chamber's deci-
sion 117 that the identity of several victims and witnesses could be withheld
from the accused and his counsel in order to protect the witnesses and
victims is unfortunate, and probably violates article 14(3)(e) of the
ICCPR.118 Although Tribunal rule 75 provides for the protection of victims
111. 35 I.L.M. 32, 57 (1996).
112. Id. at 62.
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., Bassiouni's & Manikas' commentary on article 3. They assume that it
will be limited to international conflicts. BAssIouNi & MANiKAS, supra note 69, at 510.
115. See supra note 110.
116. See BAssIouNI & MANIICAs, supra note 69, at 547-48.
117. Prosecutor v. Tadie I, supra note 85.
118. "[Elveryone [charged with a criminal offense] shall be entitled to... examine, or
have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination
of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him." ICCPR,
supra note 54, art. 14 (3)(e), reprinted in 6 LL.M. at 368. See generally Leigh, supra note
91.
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and witnesses, it is arguable that it only intends to permit withholding of
identity evidence from the public, not from the accused or his counsel.' 19
Further, rule 75 specifically states that protection orders must be "consis-
tent with the rights of the accused."' 20 The dilemma of the Tribunal was
acute. Many victims, particularly rape victims, are understandably reluc-
tant to present evidence in open court. The Tribunal does not have a full-
fledged, well-funded witness protection program. Although a Victims and
Witnesses Unit has been established to assist those who are called to tes-
tify, it does not have the ability to protect victims and witnesses once they
return home. Perhaps the trial chamber's decision to allow a witness' testi-
mony without revealing his or her identity seemed a workable compromise.
Such witnesses can be cross-examined, but counsel may be deprived of
demeanor evidence and is unable to carry out background investigations.
Perhaps the president of the Tribunal should have explained these difficul-
ties to the U.N. Secretary-General and argued in favor of a well-funded wit-
ness protection program. Given the financial impecunities of the United
Nations, however, perhaps he knew that it would be to no avail. Perhaps he
also guessed that, given the extreme disruption of victims' lives that had
already occurred, identity protection was the only basis upon which many
of them would testify. Becauase the trial chamber's decision was proce-
dural and could not be appealed at that point in time, this issue will doubt-
less be raised on appeal after trial. The appeals chamber will naturally be
reluctant to reverse, but if it does so Tadit may have to be retried-not a
pleasant prospect for either the accused or the prosecutor.
IV. What Is Your Appraisal of the Tribunal's Chances for Success?
VALERIE Epps: Success is a multi-faceted word. In one sense the very exist-
ence of the Tribunal is in itself a success. The Tribunal has already issued
some important decisions on the scope of the substantive law governing
the trials and the legitimacy of the Security Council's powers in creating
the Tribunal. If the trials of those currently in custody and those already
indicted 12 1 go forward there will doubtlessly be a large body of rulings that
will contribute to the clarification and exposition of international criminal
law in the context of armed conflict. That will constitute another success.
The ultimate test of the Tribunal's success, however, will turn on
whether the Tribunal gains custody of the major planners, strategists, and
commanders in the war and successfully prosecutes a fair number of them.
Convictions of only low-level personnel such as Tadit, although important,
119. 33 1L.M. at 527 (1994).
120. Id.
121. There are at present seventy-four people who have been indicted, of whom seven
are in custody. Drazen Erdemovic, an ethnic Croat who served in the Bosnian Serb
army, was sentenced to ten years in prison for crimes against humanity after he "con-
fessed to taking part in an execution squad and killing scores of unarmed men." Marlise
Simons, War Crimes Panel in First Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1996, at Al, A8. See
generally Stephen Kinzer, Defendant in Bosnian War-Crime Case Is Sent Home, Gravely ill,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1996, at A7; Theodor Meron, A Trial Without Witnesses, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 7, 1996, at A25.
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would be a hollow victory, and would taint the Tribunal with the stigma of
having delivered unequal justice. The world has lived through too many
wars in which only the "little guy" was prosecuted. 122 Radovan Karadzic,
the Bosnian Serb political leader, and Ratko Mladic, the Bosnian Serb mili-
tary commander, have both been indicted but neither is in custody. NATO
forces apparently allowed an opportunity to arrest Karadzic to pass,123 and
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, at the time the chief
negotiator for the United States, had to diffuse tensions between the Bos-
nian government and the Bosnian Serb leadership after the Bosnian govern-
ment had arrested two suspected Serbian officers and handed them over to
the NATO implementation force (IFOR) for delivery to the Tribunal. 124
Without such mediation the peace process might well have collapsed. It is
hard to imagine the Tribunal continuing trials if war breaks out again.
Continued peace is perhaps a necessary condition for the ultimate success
of the Tribunal.
If the Tribunal is judged a success it may well serve as a model for
future ad hoc international criminal tribunals, as it has already for the
Rwanda tribunal. Tribunals created to deal with particular crises are at the
great disadvantage of having to respond to a particular set of atrocities
within the framework of a particularized statute and rules. They are also
subject to the criticism of only being created for some, but by no means all,
crises. Perhaps the final test of the Yugoslav Tribunal's success will be
whether the experience with the Tribunal persuades the international com-
munity to create a permanent international criminal court, preferably
through a multilateral treaty process.
MICHAEL ScHAFu: According to United Nations Under-Secretary-Gen-
eral for Legal Affairs, Carl August Fleischhauer, the International Tribunal
was set up to achieve three fundamental goals: "ending war crimes, bring-
ing the perpetrators to justice and breaking an endless cycle of ethnic vio-
lence and retribution."' 25 Furthermore, former United States Ambassador
to the United Nations, Madeleine Albright, has stated that a primary pur-
pose of the International Tribunal should be to "establish the historical
record before the guilty can reinvent the truth."126 I agree with Professor
Epps that to achieve these goals at least some of the "major planners, strate-
gists, and commanders" who are primarily responsible for the crimes must
be brought before the International Tribunal.
With the exception of Slobodan Milosevic (the president of Serbia),
the Yugoslavia Tribunal has so far not shied away from indicting the
responsible "big wigs." Among the first to be indicted by the Yugoslavia
122. After the Vietnam War, the only member of the U.S. military to be prosecuted
was Lieutenant William Calley. U.S. v. Calley, 46 C.M.R. 1131 (1973).
123. Chris Hedges, Bosnia Limits War-Crimes Arrests After NATO Delivers 2 Suspects,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1996, at Al.
124. Id.
125. Andrew Kelly, U.N. Convenes Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal, Amid Doubts, Reu-
ter Eur. Comm. Rep., Nov. 17, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
126. Stanley Meisler, Jury Still Out on Bosnian War Crimes Tribunal Created by U.N.,
L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 25, 1993, at A5.
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Tribunal were Radovan Karadzic (the Bosnian Serb political leader), Ratko
Mladic (the Bosnian Serb military commander), and Milan Martic (the Cro-
atian Serb political leader), whom the Tribunal charged with genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes. 127 Bringing such persons to jus-
tice in Yugoslavia will be much more difficult than at Nuremberg.
Following World War II, the Allies had physical control of a defeated
Germany, suspected war criminals were in allied custody, and prosecutors
had access to meticulously kept Nazi documents. 128 The staff of the
Nuremberg Tribunal numbered 2,000, "with more than 100 prosecutors
and an army of a million soldiers to provide all the necessary support."
1 29
The Yugoslavia Tribunal's staff is less than a fifth of that size, and NATO's
50,000 peacekeeping forces have neither control of the territory of most of
the former Yugoslavia nor access to documents and other evidence present
there. Furthermore, unlike Nuremberg, the Yugoslavia Tribunal is not
empowered to conduct trials in absentia. The Serbs, in particular, continue
to possess the military power to resist court orders for surrender of accused
Serbs, and have obstructed United Nations efforts to gain access to evi-
dence needed for indictments. 130
Even if these "big wigs" are not surrendered to the Tribunal, however,
such persons will become international outcasts and virtual prisoners in
their own country, given the prospect of arrest if they step outside those
borders. Furthermore, high level government officials charged with war
crimes and crimes against humanity may find it difficult, if not impossible,
to conduct business with other countries. Thus, the procedures for indict-
ment and the issuance of arrest warrants set forth in the Statute and Rules
of the International Tribunal may be used to constrain accused persons,
even if the accused cannot be arrested and tried immediately. 131 The
super-indictment procedure of rule 61, which was described earlier by Pro-
fessor Epps, 132 will go a long way in establishing the historic record of the
atrocities.
In my view the real test of the Yugoslavia Tribunal came at the Dayton
peace negotiations in November of 1995. There, the chief prosecutor of the
127. Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., at 6-7, U.N. Doc. A/50/365
(1995).
128. The documents submitted in the course of the Nuremberg trials numbered over
700 million pages and weighed more than 4,000 tons. See JOHN ALAN APPLaAN, Muj-
TARY TRIBUNALS AND INTEmNAIONAL CimBs IX (1954).
129. Remarks by M. Cherif Bassiouni, Am. Soc. Int'l L Proceedings of the 87th Annual
Meeting (1993) at 22. The U.S. contingent alone numbered 654 at its peak. See Report
of the President by Mr. Justice Jackson, Oct. 7, 1946, at 2.
130. Serbs have repeatedly prevented the U.N. from gaining access to mass grave cites
in areas under their control. See Flynn McRoberts, At De Paul, War Is Waged Against
Balkan Atrocities, Cm. TRm., Nov. 21, 1993, § 2, at 1, 5.
131. Remarks of Dr. Roy S. Lee, Principal Legal Officer at the United Nations, Office
of the Legal Counsel, Symposium on War Crimes Tribunal, 6 PACE I'rr'L L. REv. 93, 101
(1994).
132. See supra text accompanying note 62.
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Yugoslavia Tribunal asked the United States to ensure that surrender of
indicted suspects be a condition for any peace accord.133 The U.S. negotia-
tor, Richard Holbrooke, responded that he would not make such a condi-
tion a "show stopper" to the larger peace settlement. 134 Consequently,
there was a very real chance that the entire Yugoslavia Tribunal would be
bargained away in an effort to stop the war. After all, the United States and
United Nations had in the last few years pushed amnesty-for-peace deals in
Cambodia, South Africa, and Haiti,135 and the Security Council had not
long before rescinded the arrest order for Somali warlord Mohammed
Aideed in an effort to "foster a political dialogue which can lead to national
reconciliation." 136 But the Bosnian government was insistent and, aston-
ishingly, the Serbs ultimately consented to provisions in the Dayton
Accords that require their full cooperation with the Tribunal. 137
Having survived Dayton, the Yugoslavia Tribunal has come too far not
to be permitted to finish the job. At this point, the members of the Security
Council are keenly aware that the cost of prematurely terminating the Tri-
bunal would be to damage irreparably the credibility of the United
Nations, as well as the rule of law. "For, once the world community puts its
hand to this particular plough, it can look back only at the peril of surren-
dering all moral authority to those who have committed unspeakable acts
in the cynical expectation that they will never have to answer for them."'1 38
Finally, I'd like to address the question of whether the Tribunal was
right to focus on such a minor sadist for its first case, whereas Nuremberg
tried the key Nazi leaders themselves. If, as one newspaper put it, "Mr.
Tadit was no more than a monstrous tadpole in a pool of sharks,"139 why
should he have been the subject of the Tribunal's first prosecution? There
are several very good answers to that question. First, Dusko Tadit fell into
the hands of the international community when he was arrested in Ger-
many in 1994. Given the nature of his alleged offenses and the massive
body of evidence pointing to his guilt, the Tribunal could not just turn a
blind eye to the allegations. Second, through the Tadid case the Tribunal
has begun to build a pyramid of evidence leading to the principals ulti-
mately responsible for the horror in Bosnia. Third, to the victims of Dusko
133. Stephen Engelberg, Panel Seeks U.S. Pledge on Bosnia War Criminals, N.Y. TIMEs,
Nov. 3, 1995, at Al.
134. Id. at A12.
135. See Scharf, supra note 19, at 1, 37.
136. Id. at 11.
137. See Letter Dated 29 November 1995 from the Permanent Representative of the
United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N.
SCOR, 50th Sess., at 4 (General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzego-
vina, article IX), 23 (Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement, article
X), 63 (Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, article 11 (8)), U.N. Doc. A/50/790
(1995), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 75, 90, 100, 120 (1996).
138. Paul C. Szasz, Legal Adviser, International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia,
The International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and the War Crimes Issue, Am. Soc.
Int'l L Proceedings of the 87th Annual Meeting 29, 32 (1993).
139. John Lichfield, Sharks Escape as the Hague Tries a Minnow, THE INDEPENDENT, May
12, 1996, at 14, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
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Tadit and his colleagues, to those who suffered as a result of the actions of
ordinary prison guards and police officials, it is important that some of
their torturers be brought to justice. Only by prosecuting individuals at all
levels of responsibility can the victims see that justice has been done.
Finally, the Tadie case has provided an opportunity for the Tribunal to iron
out the bugs and polish the international legal rules before turning to the
bigger fish and more difficult cases.
Historians are likely to rank the trial of Dusko Tadit as among the
most important trials of the century. Unlike other renowned trials, the
importance of the Tadik case lies not in the status of the defendant, but in
the fact that the proceedings constituted an historic turning-point for the
world community. For, just as the Nuremberg trial launched the era of
human rights promulgation fifty years ago, the Tadie trial has inaugurated
a new age of human rights enforcement. As the Yugoslav Tribunal, itself,
reflected in its first annual report:
The United Nations, which over the years has accumulated an impressive
corpus of international standards enjoining States and individuals to con-
duct themselves humanely, has now set up an institution to put those stan-
dards to the test, to transform them into living reality. A whole body of lofty,
if remote, United Nations ideals will be brought to bear upon human beings
.. Through the Tribunal, those imperatives will be turned from abstract
tenets into inescapable commands. 140
140. Annual Report of the International Tribunal, supra note 34, at 49.

